nd 1998 no one knew what to expect about the future of Indonesia over any horizon, from days to years to decades. The previous day Suharto has resigned after over 30 years in power and all bets were off. From the vantage point of 2010 we know what did happen politically, elections were held in June of 1999 as promised and "democracy" has proved more robust in Indonesia than many have feared and, after the re-election of Yudhoyono in 2009 one can say that May 21 st 1998 began a transition to electoral democracy. In this paper I examine how other outcomes, particularly economic outcomes such as GDP growth and poverty, but also governance outcomes have evolved in this period of democracy. Overall, I argue that outcomes are roughly as good as should have been expected-not that outcomes were terrifically better than in the pretransition period, but because the empirical data from other transitions should have warned against over-optimistic predictions on how much or how rapidly transitions to electoral democracy, a positive transition in its own right, should have created positive transitions-in growth, in poverty reduction, or even in "governance" in practice.
Introduction
Benchmarking is an essential component of any performance assessment. While the world of high finance is hardly the place to draw positive lesson just these days, the rewards to portfolio managers give a simple and clear example. People who manage allocated a portfolio within a certain asset class, say US bonds, or European equities, or "emerging market" bonds, or small cap equities or so on, are rewarded based on how well their investments do relative to an index of the entire class of assets. Although this compensation scheme has its problems, it makes sense as you cannot ask the person allocating your portfolio among various US municipal bond options to make the same returns as the person managing the "value equity" makes, as this holds the portfolio manager responsible for events beyond their control, like whether stocks outperformed bonds, not the results of their own actions or decisions.
After the crisis, Indonesia did not return to the very rapid rates of economic growth that prevailed for over 30 years during the Suharto regime. Growth, which was 5.9 ppa from 1987 to 1997 was only 3.7 ppa from the nadir of the crisis in 1999 to 2008.
Growth was slower by (roughly) 2.2. ppa. Is that a "disappointment"? Are those growth rates an indictment of the policies or economic management of the democratic governments? How one assesses performance depends on the benchmark. I argue that Indonesia' past growth is not an appropriate benchmark for assessing the growth performance of Indonesia 1999 to 2008 as it ignores two key facts relevant to benchmarking performance.
Preliminary and Incomplete:
3 9/28/2010 For Comments Only First, the literature on economic growth has documented that economic growth is "episodic" rather than steady and that there is very powerful "regression to the mean" in economic growth rates so that economies that have growth fast in the past are expected to slow down (not necessarily have slower than average growth, but to be slower than their previous pace). If one takes as a benchmark the expected rate of growth based on crossnational estimates of the magnitude of regression to the mean then, with just this factor alone, Indonesia performs right at the benchmark.
Second, it is likely that a major political transition affects the rate of economic growth through a variety of channels. In analysis original to this paper I identify all country episodes of rapid democratization and examine the growth rates ten years before and ten years after this political transition. For countries that went into growth rates with an above average growth rate there appears to be a "democratic transition" affect that slows post-transition growth by about 2 ppa. Again, this affect alone could fully account for Indonesia's slower growth.
The combination of the two effects implies that if the "benchmark" for growth 1999 to 2008 is "countries with rapid growth up to 1997 and a large democratizing transition" then the expected deceleration of growth is between 3.5 ppa and 4.3 ppa. By this benchmark Indonesia's actual post-transition growth rate of 3.7 ppa and deceleration of only 2.2 relative to the pre-crisis rates of 5.9 ppa are actually a substantial better performance than realistic benchmarks based on the performance of other countries.
Using the same type of benchmarking exercise I also look at how Indonesia has done on various aspects of "governance" since the political transition. In that domain there are mixed messages. There has been no progress in "bureaucratic capability"-but 
I. Democratic Transitions and Economic Growth
It is tough to make predictions, Especially about the future.
Yogi Berra (Baseball player)
As the famous New York Yankee and noted savant pointed out, it is much easier to predict the past than the future. I therefore start with the easy part, reviewing Indonesia's growth performance before, during, and after the economic crisis and political transition of 1997/98. But even about the past, the much trickier question is, "is the growth performance since the crisis and political transition better or worse that was The financial crisis that began in Thailand and spread to other East Asian countries resulted in a particularly severe crisis for Indonesia. The Rupiah collapsed (before any inflation), most of the banking sector was illiquid and insolvent, and new investment ground to a halt. This was followed by inflation, a rapid rise in rice prices, a huge rise in poverty (see section on poverty below). However, somewhat amazingly to those of us living through it, by 1999 the crisis was stemmed and the economy "stabilized" at a much lower level. On June 7, 1999 the first post-New Order national elections were held and the democratic transition moved along. higher than at the nadir of the crisis (and almost 20 percent higher than the pre-crisis peak).
Whether this growth performance has under or over performed "expectations" depends on what "expectations" were. One, super-optimistic, scenario would be a quick recovery (a 'V' shaped recovery to the 1997 level in two years) plus a resumption of the rapid pre-crisis growth rate of 5.9 percent. In that scenario output would have increased It might not seem unreasonable to "expect" that this good political transition to democracy would be accompanied by good outcomes on the economic front: that growth and poverty reduction would be as rapid, or perhaps even more rapid, than during the Suharto years. It is in this light that Indonesia's post-crisis, post-transition growth could be seen as "disappointing."
However, is this really what the experience and data from other countries around the world would really lead us to expect? Have other countries that have had very rapid transitions to democracy experienced more or less rapid growth after their political transition. This question I can answer.
The concept of "governance" is hugely complicated, but can be divided into two conceptually distinct components, the "polity"-how political leadership arrives to power-and the second is "administrative performance" of the government itself (to which we return in the next section). One commonly used indicator of the "polity" is a measure called, unsurprisingly, POLITY which ranks countries on a scale of "autocracy" from zero to negative 10 and "democracy" from zero to positive 10. The simple sum of those two indicators gives an empirical ranking that ranges from negative 10 (completely autocratic) to positive 10 (completely democratic). Just to illustrate the range of the ranking selected East Asian examples are given in Table 1 . As can be seen this rating has nothing intrinsic to do with economic performance (both China and Vietnam are rated as -7) not even with quality of "governance" in the sense of administrative capability to Preliminary Knowing that Indonesia has been a democracy since 1999 however does very little to help in what one should have "expected" from its growth rate. Figure 4 is the simple display of countries' average POLITY score and their growth rate over the [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] period (each country is identified with a three letter code and Indonesia is highlighted inside the circle). The median growth rate of the "imperfect democracies" in this period (defined as those countries with an average POLITY score above 5 but less than 10) is 2.95 ppa, which puts Indonesia's growth rate over this period (in this data set) of 3.3 ppa pretty squarely in the middle of growth performance. But, there is really no strong association between growth and POLITY score, the "autocracies" do slightly better, 4.3 ppa, the countries in between do worse, 1.39 ppa but mostly there are countries at a large range of economic growth in each POLITY category 1 .
13 9/28/2010 For Comments Only The simple comparison "democracies" grow faster or slower than "non-democracies" does not capture the possibility that transitions themselves might have impacts. In this case while in the long-run democracies might be capable of sustaining rapid growth the transition period itself creates an adjustment period of slow growth. To examine this question we need to compare growth before and after rapid, large, political transitions from autocracy to democracy, for which we need to identify "large" transitions. First, I searched over the POLITY combined democracy indicator (sum of autocracy and democracy) to identify all instances in which the POLITY index changed by more Tabellini (2006) regress annual growth rates on a dummy variable that =1 if the POLITY score is above zero and 0 if POLITY is below zero and show this is associated with more rapid growth. This is a particular functional form of a "step function" in which an improvement in democracy from Malaysia's 2006 value of 4 to Netherlands at 10 would have no effect and the reduction in autocracy in Jordan from -9 to -2 should have no impact, but moving across exactly zero should have all of the impact. 14 9/28/2010 For Comments Only than 5 units in a single year (say from -7 to -1 or from 2 to 8). These are candidates for large democratic transition. Then there is a decision tree to classify and time to the transition, especially to cope with countries with multiple transitions that is described in Table 2 , with examples (starting with Indonesia). The results of this classification scheme are 52 episodes of large democratic transitions (see Appendix Table A .1 for the complete list). 1995=3, 1996=-6, 1997=-6, 1998=5 (no sustained democratic transition, brief cycle into autocracy)
If a country has three or more episodes then each was classified separately depending on the timing and direction of changes (20 countries) to keep and date distinct episodes.
Once the episodes of large democratic transitions had been identified the next step is calculate growth rates "before" and "after" the episode. But as we want to capture the medium term we calculate the 10 year growth rate up to 3 years before the transition and the growth rate from one year after the transition for 10 years (or until the data ends).
Preliminary and Incomplete: 15 9/28/2010 For Comments Only Figure 5 illustrates the timing of the growth episodes, using Indonesia's transition in 1999 as an example 2 . Table 3 gives the first key result of the empirical analysis of the transitions, which is that countries that have experienced large democratic transitions beginning from a preceding period of above average growth (higher than the cross-national average of 2 ppa) experienced sharp decelerations of growth rates in the 10 years following the (year after) the transition. So, according to the PWT6.3 data on the growth rate of purchasing power parity adjusted real GDP per capita, Indonesia's growth rate from 1986 to 1996 2 These timing assumptions are not innocuous. Often a political transition is preceded by a large fall in GDP per capita, sometimes as the result of the chaos of the political transition itself. If one then calculates the growth "before" the transition to include this fall, which could be the result of the transition itself, then it will look like the political transition accelerated growth. This is why I go back some years before the transition so that the pure disruption effects are not counted as part of the "pre-democratic" period. Rodrik and Wacziag (2005) for instance do an analysis similar to examine growth impacts of democratic transitions and date the transitions to just before the transition. They find similar results overall, of the nine countries they identify with democratizing transitions begun from above 2 ppa growth the average deceleration was 3.53 ppa which is exactly what we find in Table 3 . But in some instances the differences in timing produce clearly different country results. For instance, we both find a democratic transition in the Philippines dated to 1986. Since GDP fell from 1984 to 1986 by their dating growth in the Philippines accelerated whereas my timing compares growth of 1974 to 1984 and finds growth decelerated. This, first-cut, analysis suggests Indonesia has had less deceleration of economic growth than Indonesia should have "expected" if expectations were grounded in the experience of other countries. First, of the 22 country episodes of large democratic transition from above average growth all but one experienced a growth deceleration (Korea 1987 is the sole exception with an acceleration of only .22 ppa). The combination of high initial growth and democratic transition makes some deceleration all but inevitable. Second, the magnitude of the decelerations experiences was very large: the median deceleration across these 22 countries was 2.99 ppa and the average deceleration 3.5 ppa. So if Indonesia had experience the "typical" (median) or average (mean) deceleration of this group of countries its growth rate would have been 2.55 ppa (5.54 less 2.99) or 2.01 ppa (5.54 less 3.53) rather than the 3.3 ppa growth it actually experienced. So, while one framing is that Indonesian growth has been "disappointing" in the democratic era, this is only relative to an arbitrary expectation that it would maintain the same growth rate. But there is no evidence to suggest that zero deceleration is a reasonable "expectation" for post democratic transition growth. The data in Table 3 does not suggest that "democracy" or "democratic transitions" The data say the countries that had above average growth before their large democratic transition had very substantial growth decelerations in the medium run (10 years) after that transition. There are two immediate questions about whether this has Preliminary and Incomplete:
19 9/28/2010 For Comments Only anything to do with "transitions" at all, and if so whether it had anything to do with "democratic" transitions.
The first issue is that, contrary to popular narratives in which "growth" is a persistent feature of countries, in fact growth rates are very volatile and exhibit very little persistence 3 . There is strong "regression to the mean" so that countries with rapid growth in one decade are predicted to have slower growth in the next decade-still faster than average, but slower than their previous pace. This means that part of the deceleration of rapid growth countries (and of the recovery of low growth countries) in Table 3 and Table 4 is just built into the natural lack of growth persistence and the definition of the categories: rapid growth countries are expected to decelerate whether they have a political transition or not and low growth countries are expected to accelerate growth whether they have a transition or not.
The third step therefore is to calculate the growth transition of countries with no political transition. This is a little bit tricky because the political transitions of each country is at a different year so comparing "before" and "after" for countries with no transition around some arbitrary year (say, 1999) might be misleading as it is affected by secular differences in growth rates. Instead, for each country with no political transition episode I pick a random year and do the same calculation with the timings as illustrated in Figure 5 relative to that randomly chosen year as for the countries with political transitions 4 . I can then average these countries in the categories just as for the transition 20 9/28/2010 For Comments Only countries. As expected, it really is the case that countries with above average growth are expected to have their growth decelerate and with below zero growth are expected to have their growth accelerate (that is, there is "regression to the mean") even around some arbitrarily chosen year. The average deceleration for countries with growth above 2 ppa is 1.8 ppa, which returns them roughly to the cross-national average. The average acceleration for countries with less than zero growth is larger, 4.6 ppa, which is larger in part because these country's growth rate is further from the cross-national average than the "high growth" countries (as they are defined as those not just below the average, but below zero).
The deceleration of the growth rate of countries that started with above average growth and did have a large democratizing transition of 3.5 ppa is substantially larger than the counter-factual of the growth deceleration of countries with no transition 1.8 ppa. So the "difference in difference"-the change in growth rates before and after (difference) between the democratizing countries and no transition countries (difference) is itself -1.76 ppa-countries with large democratizing transitions, on average, decelerated by 1.76 ppa more than countries with no political transition. So, crudely put, the growth deceleration of rapidly growing economies following a large democratizing transition seems to be about half "natural" deceleration due to regression the mean and half due to the democratizing episode itself. 
Source: author's calculations.
A second "counter-factual" is to compare the growth deceleration of countries with large democratizing episodes to countries with large shifts in the POLITY ranking away from democracy and towards autocracy. Exactly the same procedure as described in Table 2 was followed in defining the timing of country episodes of moving away from democracy. The question then is whether countries that began political transitions with above average growth had larger decelerations if that transition was "democratizing" versus moving away from democracy. (The list of all "autocratizing" episodes is in Appendix Table A .2). Turns out that the countries with above average growth had much less deceleration after an autocratizing episode than the countries that had a democratizing episode-only 1.4 ppa deceleration. The deceleration was about 2.2 ppa less for these countries than for democratizing countries. This does not imply Preliminary and Incomplete: 22 9/28/2010 For Comments Only autocratizing episodes "helped" in some absolute sense as remember the "no episode" countries decelerated by only 1.8 ppa so the rapidly growing autocratizing countries had only slightly less than the "natural" deceleration. Two final benchmark comparisons are to use simple regressions that associate the change in countries growth rates with their previous growth rate (and level of income).
The first simple comparison is to just take all the "developing" countries (with GDP per capita lower than PPP$10,000 in 19987) and regress the change in growth rates between 1987 to 1997 and 1999 and 2007 for all countries. In this regression Indonesia's "predicted" deceleration is 1.97 ppa versus the actual of 2.15 ppa. So regression to the mean alone can explain all of Indonesia's growth deceleration.
The second simple regression is to regress the change in growth rates for all 52
countries with large democratizing transitions on their initial growth rate (and level of income at the beginning of the post transition growth period). This is the predicted deceleration for those countries which experienced democratic transition. From this the predicted deceleration for Indonesia is 4.26 ppa-which combines the "regression to the mean" and the "large democratizing transition."
I.C) Summary of the post-transition growth performance
Preliminary But, the analysis of large democratizing episodes suggests that countries that go into these episodes with above average growth (nearly) always experience significant deceleration of growth. The average deceleration among the 22 countries was 3.53 so the predicted for Indonesia if it experience the average deceleration was growth of only 2.01 ppa so Indonesia outperformed in growth by 1.27 ppa.
Preliminary and Incomplete: 25 9/28/2010 For Comments Only Finally, a simple regression of "post-transition" growth rates on all large democratizing transitions and the previous rate of growth actually predicts that Indonesia's growth was predicted to slow to only 1.28 ppa through the combined effects of regression to the mean and democratic transition. This benchmark therefore completely reverses the sense that democracy in Indonesia has been "disappointing" in its growth performance, relative to the benchmark Indonesia has actually managed to sustain much higher growth than other, reasonable, benchmarks would have predicted. 1987-1997 to 1999-2008 5.98 (1999-2008) 
(1999-2008) -2.28
Median, all developing countries, 1999-2007 2.56 (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) 3. 29 (1999-2007) 
+.72
Regression to the mean-predicting changes growth 1999-2007 versus 1987-1997 based on developing countries 3. 47 (1999-2007) 3. 29 (1999-2007) 
-.18
Countries with large democratic transitions starting with above average (>2 ppa) growth (table 3, predicted=5.54-3.53) 2.01 (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) 3. 28 (2000-2007) 
+1.27
Predicted value from regression among 52 countries with large democratizing transitions 1.28 (2000-2007) 3. 28 (2000-2007) 
+2.0
Source: Author's calculations.
II. How fast does democracy improve Governance
A distinct question is whether large democratizing transitions tend to improve other aspects of "governance" measured as the capability of the administration for implementation (as opposed to policy making). This is more difficult empirically as there The first component is really just to reassure myself that the comparisons between the two sources, POLITY and ICRG, make sense and hence I examine whether countries with a large democratizing POLITY transition have a reported increase in Democratic Accountability according to ICRG. Indeed, the changes for democratizing transitions are positive and very large while those for autocratic transitions are negative.
One interesting question is whether democracies have, on average, more capable administrations, as there if often the argument that authoritarian regimes can "make the trains run on time." In the case of Indonesia ICRG rates that there has been neither improvement nor deterioration in bureaucratic quality since 1998-ranked a 2 on a o to 4 scale in both periods. Interestingly, democratizing transitions are not really "expected" to lead to that much improvement as those countries with transitions had an average improvement of only .4 units larger than countries with no transition at all.
5 Analysis using the pre-transition average to 10 years post-transition gave quite similar results.
Preliminary and Incomplete: 27 9/28/2010 For Comments Only After the transition, and especially in recent years, there has been an effort to check corruption. According to the ICRG ratings Indonesia has been quite successful as control of corruption has improved from 1.25 to 3.83-a massive increase (more than two crossnational standard deviations). Interestingly, the data does not predict nearly that much improvement-only a .32 greater gain for large democratizing transitions than others. A final comparison of interest is "law and order." On this score there has been some improvement, but quite modest. Interestingly, on this indicator progress has been actually less than predicted among transition countries, rising by .5 compared to an "expected" rise among large democratic transitions of 1.08 units.
III. Democracy and Poverty
A final domain over which one might have expected a democratic transition to be a good transition is poverty reduction. Here one might have thought that a democratic Preliminary and Incomplete: 28 9/28/2010 For Comments Only government, motivated by elections and disciplined by democratic accountability (which did, as we saw, actually increase) would be able to engineer larger poverty reductions than during the previous authoritarian regime. That was not so, nor, I would argue, was there any good reason to expect it to be so. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the headcount poverty rate-the proportion of the population below an absolute threshold of household per capita consumption expenditures. The series breaks in 1996 as the poverty line calculation was re-done so the first series and second series are comparable to within but not to each other. This shows the extremely rapid reduction of poverty from 1976 to 1996-from 40 percent points of the population to only 11.6 percent in only 20 years. This is one, if not the most rapid reduction in mass destitution in all of history. This is of course interrupted by the crisis, with poverty increasing quite dramatically, then resuming a downward trend, but less rapidly than prior to the crisis and with an actual reversal in The question is whether the downward trend good enough news or whether it is "disappointing"-which again depends on what one expected to happen. Here there is insufficient comparable cross-national, time-series data on poverty headcount rates to do the episodic analysis of democratizing episodes that were possible for growth or governance indicators. Instead, I discuss three scenarios to illustrate that part of the puzzle is not just that growth was slower in the democratic period but also the responsiveness of poverty reductions to growth (the poverty elasticity) appears to have fallen. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the poverty headcount rate with the actual data (the "new series" of Figure 6 ) and three scenarios. The first scenario asks what the evolution of the poverty rate would have been had poverty had the same responsiveness to growth (elasticity) as in the 1976 to 1996 period. Table 9 shows the calculation of the "poverty elasticity of growth" which is simply the ration of the percentage reduction in the poverty headcount rate to the percentage Preliminary and Incomplete: 30 9/28/2010 For Comments Only increase in GDP per capita. Overall during the 1976 to 1996 period (using the old poverty headcount series) the average (median) elasticity was -1.15 (-1.24). We have seen above that there is no reason to expect more rapid growth following democratizing transitions for growing countries so this rules out the first effect, but even compensating for that poverty did not fall as fast so it might appear that factors (b) and (c) worked against more rapid poverty reduction.
The better distribution of income would have been the name for more "pro-poor" growth, which one might have expected from a democratic government. However, the principal difficulty is that in spite of the huge number of references to "pro-poor growth" or "inclusive growth" or "broad-based growth" 6 there is no firm, empirically based, guidance as to which actual governmental actions or policies might produce such growth. 33 9/28/2010 For Comments Only Since the distribution of income across households is the result of the complete general equilibrium outcome of an economy involving millions of firms and individuals taking investment, production, and consumption decisions it is unlikely that any simple formula are likely to emerge. In fact, as with any complex problem, it is perfectly possible for well-meaning but naïve actions to have counter-productive results. For instance, it might seem that since the main asset of the poor is (unskilled) labor that "pro-labor" actions would be pro-poor, and that "strengthening" labor production would therefore be propoor. But, it is possible that the increased labor protections are only effective in the formal sector, where wages are already high, which causes a reduction for demand for labor in the formal sector which then expands the supply of labor in the informal section which then reduces the relative wages in the informal sector, which actually increases poverty. Note that I am not asserting that this is the case, I am just giving an example in which a democratic government could adopt a seemingly "pro-poor" action (that was also in some quarters politically popular) than nevertheless actually would, through the repercussions of the actions of economic agents have exactly the opposite effect.
Another example, might be raising the price of rice by say, banning imports. While it might seem "pro-poor" as "the poor" are rice farmers, in fact many of the poor are net consumers of rice so that an increase in the price of rice through a ban on imports-again an action both politically popular and seemingly "pro-poor"-would actually increase poverty. Again, the point is not about particular actions but rather that one can hardly have expected democratic governments to have been more "pro-poor" in the absence of reliable guidance as to what actions would in fact be pro-poor and that those would be politically more popular in a democratic arena.
Preliminary and Incomplete: 34 9/28/2010 For Comments Only A second reason that a democratic government might have been expected to have more rapid poverty reduction is that it would pursue policies of more "pro-poor" public expenditures, such as larger or better targeted social transfer programs. This might be true if one were to define poverty broadly, but with a narrow and penurious definition of poverty that includes only roughly 15 percent of the population it is not at all clear why a democracy would aggressively target this definition of "poverty." After all, poverty, in that sense, affects, at any point in time only one in six citizens whereas in a democracy you need 50 percent of the votes. Theoretical papers of targeting that I have done with Jonah Gelbach (e.g. Gelbach and Pritchett 1996) show that voters prefer less sharp targeting than the poverty minimizing allocation of a fixed budget by a technocrat would produce---that is, in a simple three income group setting (poor, middle, rich) sharp propoor targeting only emerges when the rich are disproportionately powerful. When the middle group has a political weight equal to its population share then uniform targeting (everyone gets a transfer of the same amount) is the "strongest" targeting that is politically feasible. A recent experimental paper (Alatas, et al 2010) also suggests that voter satisfaction with sharp "proxy means test" targeting without community engagement in selection of beneficiaries is not locally popular. So, while naively one might associated "democracy" and "pro-poor" there is not theoretical or empirical justification for that when "poor" is construed on narrow consumption expenditure definitions. "what has Indonesia's democratic governments done wrong, that growth performance has been so poor"? But this assumes that a "natural" prediction of growth for a country is its own past performance. That is perhaps a "natural" assumption in Newtonian physicsthat objects in motion remain in motion-but it is not a natural assumption in any activity that involves regression to the mean. If you just shot your best round of golf ever, the best guess is that your next round will be worse.
Conclusion
Moreover, there are reasons to believe, and an analysis of democratic episodes suggests, that large political transitions create at least a short to medium term slow down in growth. The estimates in this paper are that for countries that begin an episode of large, rapid, democratization with above average growth the "expected" deceleration of growth is 2.2 ppa.
The combination of these benchmarking adjustments is that perhaps the right question is "what is it about the democratizing transition in Indonesia such that growth decelerated so little?" On the other hand, Indonesia appears to have made more progress on control of corruption that would have been expected after a democratic transition. But on general "bureaucratic quality" in implementation Indonesia, by the ICRG measures, has made no progress-but was not expected to make much.
Finally, I cannot do "with and without" democratic transition measures of poverty reduction, but it does appear that Indonesia made less progress on consumption expenditure measures of headcount poverty than even could be accounted for by the lower growth rate. 
